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One of the most remarkable (and bizarre) elements of the ongoing 
Brexit process is the extent to which it represents England at (political) 
war with itself. That this is peculiarly and uniquely an English 
phenomenon has become obvious even to interested outsiders. 
Public opinion in Scotland overwhelmingly supports remaining in the 
EU (far more strongly than many of the rest of the EU-27) and 
Northern Ireland has its own fascinating political dynamics. There too, 
a majority wanted to “Remain” and a more substantial majority want to 
avoid hard borders. 
What of Wales? After all, Wales also narrowly voted to leave the EU 
in 2016. However, Wales is not simply a mini-England. There are very 
specific dynamics to the Welsh vote – with Gwynedd in particular 
voting quite distinctively. There is some evidence that Welsh speakers 
voted to remain inside the EU. These issues notwithstanding, Welsh 
identity also provides a strong unifying force that has (thus far) taken 
the edge off some of the divisiveness of the past 3 years (although 
Wales is definitely not immune to it). 
What is less appreciated by many observers is the extent to which it is 
emphatically not the case that England is somehow a “Brexitland” 
where everybody hates the EU and 90% of the population support a 
no-deal exit[1]. 53.4% of English voters voted to leave the EU in 2016. 
As noted in a previous blog post, 2019 is not 2016, and my own 
assessment is that if the referendum (or a rerun) were to be held now, 
the result in England (but not the UK) would be the same, Leave 
would win by a considerably narrower margin than previously. 
Where does that leave us (if you’ll pardon the pun)? A “disunited 
Kingdom”, in which England engaged in a political “civil war” with itself 
appears poised to cause the entire edifice to fall out of the EU without 
any withdrawal agreement in place, against the wishes (and to the 
enormous consternation) of at least 2 out of the 3 other constituent 
parts of the country. This is almost unique in recent UK history. 
For example, whilst it is certainly the case that Scotland and Wales 
voted emphatically against Mrs Thatcher’s administration, the same 
was true of much of the North of England[2]. In 1983, Wales returned 
more Conservative MPs than the North East (plus Cumbria) and 
Scotland returned almost as many as Yorkshire. In contrast, 
Scotland’s vote differed markedly from every English region bar 
London in 2016 (which, unlike Scotland, appears to have differed from 
the rest of England solely due to demographic factors[3]). There is 
thus now a political distinction between Scotland and England in a 
way that simply did not exist as recently as the 1980s. Whether this 
will ultimately rupture the UK remains to be seen, but dissolution of 
the Union appears to be a likely outcome at this juncture. 
Perhaps the single most worrying aspect of the ongoing drama is the 
damage to the democratic fabric of the country. How you (the reader) 
interpret that statement is, to a large extent, determined by where you 
stand on the pro vs anti-Brexit spectrum. Contrary to the 
sloganeering, there are a large pool of voters who do not have strong 
opinions. If pushed (as in the referendum itself), they will come down 
on one side or the other and they do hold an opinion on whether 
Brexit should go ahead or not but it is hardly the centrepiece of their 
lives. After all, over a quarter of the UK electorate didn’t vote during 
the 2016 referendum. 
Nevertheless, for the very substantial number – perhaps a majority – 
who do care (often passionately) about the subject, strong opinions 
emerge. For those who are strongly pro-Brexit, the democratic danger 
lies in remaining in the EU (or leaving with an insufficiently strong 
break from the EU). The deal negotiated by the government – 
whereby the UK leaves the EU but remains subject to certain 
legislation and in a customs union with the EU as a whole until a 
mutually agreed solution can be found that guarantees a “soft border” 
on the island of Ireland – is unacceptable. 
For those who oppose Brexit, the democratic danger lies in failing to 
allow the House of Commons to make the ultimate choice over what 
type of Brexit (if any) to pursue. As a parliamentary democracy, the 
UK has, hitherto, done this and to seek to cut the House of Commons 
out of proceedings (as Mr Johnson’s government threatens to do) is, 
to this school of thought, an anti-democratic outrage. For many, the 
Prime Minister’s advisor, Dominic Cummings has taken on a role 
somewhat akin to Rasputin in proceedings. 
These claims can be objectively examined. The most fundamental 
problem is that the 2016 Referendum was held by a government that 
fully expected a majority to vote to remain within the EU. It was 
worded as if it were a “confirmatory ballot” – confirming that the 
people of the UK in fact remain within the EU. However, such ballots 
are typically used to confirm whether a particular franchise wishes to 
accept a constitutional change: if they do not then the situation 
naturally defaults to what had previously appertained. 
In the Brexit case, the referendum was not to confirm a change but 
rather to ask whether voters wanted one. As a result, the referendum 
failed to offer a clear alternative. The argument that campaigners 
made (or did not make) the alternatives clear holds no water. It was 
not on the ballot paper and therefore was not an option on which to 
express a view. This is not a contention, it is simply a fact. 
This failure to specify an alternative is what leaves us such an 
unpalatable dilemma. MPs found themselves mandated to change the 
UK’s relationship with the EU, but no particular course of action was 
specified. Such an outcome is perfectly compatible with the UK’s 
parliamentary democracy, provided that elected representatives in 
Parliament had the ultimate say on the exact outcome. Given 
Parliament’s failure to reach a firm conclusion, there are two correct 
decisions that the executive might make, both of which involve 
extending Article 50 one further time: 
1. Hold a General Election, after which MPs (as elected 
representatives) must choose a particular outcome. Were a 
majority of pro-“no deal” MPs to be elected (and this is a 
perfectly feasible outcome) then they could legitimately 
undertake to the EU without any withdrawal agreement (i.e. with 
“no deal”). That this would cause damage to the UK economy is 
irrelevant: people are entitled to vote in such a way as makes 
them materially less well off. 
2. Hold a referendum on how to leave the EU. This would be 
plagued with complications, but would, ultimately, be the most 
democratic way in which to deal with the present conundrum. 
The question of which precise options should be on the ballot 
paper is a difficult one: given that the previous referendum in 
2016 was recent and entailed a rejection of the status quo, is it 
reasonable to allow “Remain” as an option? Whilst not 
completely settled, the closeness of that result, 
alongside demographic change suggest that the answer should 
be yes. This referendum should be legally binding and be 
between specific (implementable) outcomes. 
In other words, were MPs to deliberately seek to ignore the result of 
2016, that would indeed be undemocratic as argued by many 
Leavers. However, that is clearly not the case in this instance. What 
has occurred instead is a logjam, whereby whilst a majority in 
Parliament agrees (in principle) that Brexit should go ahead, there is 
no majority for any specific solution. Bypassing this via what would 
effectively be an act of executive fiat (e.g. by deliberately timing an 
election after 31st October), would therefore indeed be undemocratic. 
It is therefore incumbent upon the executive to extend the Article 50 
period in order to allow one of the two options outlined above to take 
place. 
[1] Ironically, the “bête noire” of much of the country – Michel Barnier 
– has very clearly recognised this for what it is, although he is perhaps 
too polite (and wary of being seen to involve himself in the UK’s 
internal issues) to call it out as a specifically English issue. 
[2] https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-information-
office/m09.pdf 
[3] See Hearne, D., Semmens-Wheeler, R., & Hill, K. (2018). 
‘Explaining the Brexit Vote: A socio-economic and psychological 
exploration of the referendum vote.’ In A. De Ruyter & B. Nielsen 
(Eds.), Brexit Negotiations After Article 50: Assessing Process, 
Progress and Impact. Bingley: Emerald. 
 
